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Abstract
This paper investigates the factors underlying the emergence of
Research Cluster (RC), i.e. cooperation (or coordination of research
efforts) through spatial proximity between public and private research
teams. A ’public lab’ and a ’private lab’ interact in a two-stage game
to decide on ’location’ and ’research effort’. A high level of public
subsidies associated to a low asymmetry in the ’valorisation capability’
between both labs is necessary for the formation of a cluster. We find
that RC performs better than non-cooperation in terms of research
efforts in a ’public lab’ (but not in a ’private lab’) and output gains
that can be appropriated by each lab.
Key words: research cooperation, spatial location, public sub-
sidy.
Code JEL: C7, H2, H4, L3, L5, 03.
1 Introduction
A recurrent challenge faced by European authorities is how to establish closer
cooperation between universities and firms to ensure greater production and
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better dissemination of new knowledge (European-Commission, 2003, 2008).
Regional knowledge clusters, competitiveness clusters, poles of excellence
and/or Science and Technology parks reflect such new institutional arrange-
ments that facilitate interactions between universities and industries (Link
and Scott, 2007).
These initiatives to nurture competitiveness stem from theoretical ap-
proaches and empirical investigations on the advantages of R&D coopera-
tion in the presence of knowledge spillovers (i.e. knowledge produced by
one agent that may contribute to the production of knowledge by the other
agents without cost). Theoretical models on R&D cooperation show that
coordination of research efforts between competitive firms may help firms
to internalize their knowledge spillovers, resulting in greater research efforts
and higher social welfare (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al.,
1992; De Bondt, 1997; Amir, 2000; Norman and Pepall, 2004). This argu-
ment can be applied to research partnerships between firms and universities
as well (Poyago-Theotoky, 2009; Poyago-Theotoky et al., 2002; Beath et al.,
2003). Since knowledge has the properties of a public good, outcomes of
public sector research has often been put to good use by private sector firms
(Jaffe, 1989; Audretsch et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2002; Autant-Bernard, 2001;
Cohen et al., 1994; Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005). For instance, firms using
emerging technologies (e.g. bio- and nano-technology) have a strong interest
in the knowledge produced by the public sector (Boufaden et al., 2007).
Others studies in the field of the geography of innovation have added
an important spatial dimension to the discussion by illustrating that the
positive effects also increase with proximity (Cooke, 2001; Furman et al.,
2006; Autant-Bernard and LeSage, 2011). Geographical proximity which
benefits the innovation process through diffusion of spillovers is frequently
cited as an explanation for the emergence of cooperation between universities
and firms (Audretsch, 1998; Varga, 2000; Audretsch et al., 2005).
What happens if we turn the question the other way around? Do firms
and universities tend to move closer just in order to benefit from knowl-
edge spillovers? This reverse causality is what we aim to examine in this
paper. We also explore if cooperation performs better than non-cooperation
in terms of research efforts and output gains that can be appropriated by
research actors. When the private sector research does learn from public sec-
tor research through knowledge spillovers, which depend on the geographical
proximity, it has an incentive to anchor cooperation at the same location in
order to internalise the public externalities. Many cluster initiatives refer to
Marshallian-type externalities. However, there is another force that works
in the opposite direction. Since public and private research activities are
rivals in the knowledge production and innovation, geographical proximity
2
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.13
can also enhance competition between researchers of each sector. Recently,
Bloom et al. (2013) and Ko¨nig et al. (2014) have shown that this competition
effect (or rivalry effect) has a negative and significant impact on the payoff
of the firms. This may also refer to a negative congestion externality, also
known as ”stepping on toes” effect. The race between public and private
research in genome sequencing serves as an illustration of such competition
(Carraro and Siniscalco, 2003).
Another phenomenon that we want to highlight in this paper is the impact
of the geographical proximity on the size of the labs. Here, the ’size’ of the
lab emerges as an endogenous structure in terms of the number of researchers.
However, the present model doesn’t study the monetary incentives of labs to
convince researchers to work for them. The stability of each team is given
by the conditions of the standard coalition formation theory (d’Aspremont
et al., 1983; Carraro and Siniscalco, 2003).
Let us refer to a ’Research Cluster’ (or RC) as a set of public and private
research organizations within close proximity to one another which practice
cooperation. On positive grounds, this paper studies the existence conditions
of such RC through a game theoretic formulation. Two actors ’public lab’ and
’private lab’ interact in a two-stage game to decide on ’location’ and ’research
effort’. We examine two scenarios: (i) in the first scenario, individual research
efforts are chosen to maximize each lab payoff non cooperatively, (ii) in the
second scenario, research efforts are chosen to maximize the joint payoffs. We
examine whether cooperation facilitates spatial proximity and if it can yield
a better performance than non-cooperation in terms of research efforts and
gains that can be captured by each lab. We show that the results crucially
depend on the level of the subsidy granted to the public lab together with
the valorisation of the research efforts.
To deal with the incentive problem related to the production of public
goods with externalities (spillovers), public lab is funded by a fixed subsidy
provided by the government for each researcher, unrelated to research effort.
Public lab can obtain a gain from commercialization and recognition related
to research effort through patents, prizes, public recognition of the value of
research and publications. Private lab can appropriate the research efforts
by patent or copyright. We assume a one way movement of spillovers from
the public lab to the private lab. The payoff of private lab depends on the
collective efforts of its researchers as well as the exploitation of spillovers
generated by public labs research efforts. In turn, closer proximity with
public lab facilitates greater exploitation of spillovers. In our model, we
assume realistically that for private lab the marginal benefit from its research
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effort is higher (or equal) than from research effort in public lab1. For this,
we introduce the notion of ’valorisation capability’ as the capability of a lab
to appropriate monetary value from a research output. Solving for the Nash
equilibrium, we show that ’location’ and ’research effort’ of each lab depend
on the magnitude of the subsidy and the asymmetries in the ’valorisation
capability’ between public and private lab.
Our approach incorporates some ideas previously developed in economic
geography (Fujita and Thisse, 2002). Some theoretical models examine how
spillovers between firms shape the geography of production and innovation.
They combine two different strands of literature: the theory of locational
choice and the economics of innovation, dealing with spatial competition a` la
Hotelling (Biscaia and Mota, 2012; Belleflamme et al., 2000; Gersbach and
Schmutzler, 1999) or a` la Cournot (Van Long and Soubeyran, 1998). Mai and
Peng (1999) introduce the element of cooperation between firms in the form
of innovation exchange through communication into the Hotelling spatial
competition model. Under the assumption that knowledge spillovers depend
on firms’ location, Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005) show that the distance
between firms’ location increases with the degree of product differentiation.
In the same way, Van Long and Soubeyran (1998) obtain the result that
firms agglomerate when the endogenous spillovers is a convex (or linear)
function of firms’ distance. In our model, we retain the assumption of a linear
relationship between spillovers and distance, but only private lab chooses its
location.
The contribution of the present work may be understood as follows. To
the best of our knowledge, no existing spatial theoretical model has been pro-
posed to explain the rationale for cooperative strategies at the same location
between public and private research organizations2. On positive grounds,
this paper is an attempt to fill this gap.
First, we explore the conditions on subsidy and ”valorisation capability”
levels allowing for the endogenous formation of a RC. For a given asymmetry
in valorisation capability, the level of subsidy must lie between a minimum
and a maximum level for a RC to be formed. A low level of the public subsidy
is harmful for the co-existence of public and private research organizations:
only the private research lab can exist whatever the level of asymmetry in
valorisation capability. A high level of the public subsidy does not promote a
close cooperation between the public and the private research labs: the size
of the public lab decreases with the rise of the public subsidy reducing the
1In the public lab, knowledge resulting from research effort is traited as a partial public
good and cannot be fully ”owned”.
2An exception is the paper by Mukherjee and Ramani (2011). The rationale for tech-
nology parks is explored between asymmetric firms.
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positive spillover effect from the public lab. The private lab chooses to move
away to avoid the negative competition effect. For the intermediate levels of
subsidy, the private lab benefits from spillovers to come closer to the public
lab and cooperative strategies facilitate spatial proximity.
Second, when comparing the payoff levels, we surprisingly find that the
gain from the cooperative equilibrium dominates the gain from the non-
cooperative equilibrium for a few couples of subsidy and ”valorisation capa-
bility”. Moreover, when focusing on the ’pure’ RC (i.e. cooperation at the
same location), we show that the ’pure’ RC performs better than the non-
cooperative equilibrium. However, this performance may be moderated by
the results in terms of research efforts. Cooperation between the public and
the private lab at the same location allows to encourage the public research
effort but decreases research efforts in the ’private lab’.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Next in
Section 3, we develop the results under two scenarios - competitive research
and cooperative research-. We compare and discuss the results in Section 4.
The final section concludes.
2 The model
Suppose that a research activity may be undertaken in two independent labs:
a private sector lab (pr) and a public sector lab (pu). There exists a finite
number N of researchers employed either by the public lab (n), or the private
lab (N − n) with 0 ≤ n ≤ N .
The game is modelled through two stages :
1. In the first stage, the private sector lab fixes the optimal distance from
the public sector research lab on the segment d ∈ [0, 1],
2. In the second stage, individual research efforts are chosen in each lab:
xpui , x
pr
i .
The size of each lab (number of researchers) results from the stability
property of the equilibrium.
The research undertaken by the public lab may benefit the private lab at
no cost (i.e. spillover effect) depending on location. The payoff of private lab
depends on the collective efforts of its researchers as well as the exploitation
of spillovers generated by the public lab research efforts. In turn, closer
proximity with public lab facilitates greater exploitation of spillovers. We
5
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assume a one way movement of spillovers3. In the private research sector,
the existence of intellectual property rights avoids knowledge spillovers in
order to create a private incentive mechanism.
In the same line of Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005), we consider that
the distance between both labs determines the size of the spillovers: spillovers
are null, 1−d = 0, when the private lab locates at the location farthest from
public lab, d = 1; spillovers are maximum, 1 − d = 1, when the private lab
chooses to locate at the same point as the public lab, d = 0.
The total payoff of the private research lab is given by:
Gpr(xpri ) = w
N∑
1
xpri −
N∑
1
(xpri )
2 ≡ GprA if n = 0 (1)
Gpr(xpri , x
pu
i ) = w
N∑
n+1
xpri + w (1− d)
n∑
1
xpui
−
N∑
n+1
(xpri )
2
(1 + d)
if 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 (2)
where w is the marginal benefit yielded by the effective research effort in
the private lab. The cost of research supported by each researcher depends
quadratically on its research effort (xi) and, as far as n 6= 0, negatively on
the distance (d). The term 1
1+d
captures the negative congestion externality,
also known as ”stepping on toes” effect or ”product rivalry” effect, that may
arise when researchers run parallel research programs4. Here, we consider
that both labs being closer implies additional costs in terms of efforts to
avoid competition effects. We can also interpret the impact of distance in
the cost of effort as an efficiency measure of the effort, efficiency being lower
in case of proximity between labs because of competition effects.
The public lab does not benefit from knowledge spillovers and the public
lab payoff only depends on the sum of individual researchers efforts in pu. To
deal with the incentive problem related to the production of public goods with
externalities (spillovers), public lab is funded by a fixed subsidy, denoted s,
provided by the government for each researcher, unrelated to research effort.
The total payoff from the public research lab is given by:
3This assumption is based on empirical studies (Jaffe, 1989; Audretsch et al., 2002;
Cohen et al., 2002; Autant-Bernard, 2001; Cohen et al., 1994; Veugelers and Cassiman,
2005)
4These effects have been clearly highlighted in empirical studies such as Bloom et al.
(2013) and Ko¨nig et al. (2014).
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
Gpu(xpui ) = ns +
w
a
N∑
1
xpui −
N∑
1
(xpui )
2 ≡ GpuA if n = N (3)
Gpu(xpui , x
pr
i ) = ns +
w
a
n∑
1
xpui −
n∑
1
(xpui )
2
1 + d
if 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 (4)
where w
a
is the marginal benefit yielded by the effort of each researcher
working in public lab. It represents the gain from commercialization and
recognition related to research effort through patents, prizes, public recogni-
tion of the value of research, publications.
Here, we introduce the notion of ’valorisation capability’ as the capability
of a lab to appropriate monetary value from a research output. a is a pa-
rameter which illustrates the asymmetries in the ’valorisation capability’ of
research-effort outcomes for each lab. We assume realistically that for private
lab the marginal benefit from its research effort is equal or higher than from
research effort in public lab: a ≥ 1. When a is equal to 1, the public lab
and the private lab develop the same policy of adding value to their research
effort.
3 The outcome at equilibrium
In this section we determine the non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes
that we will compare in the next section. The two stages are non-cooperative.
At the second stage, labs know the choices made at the preceding one.
3.1 Non-cooperative research between public and pri-
vate sectors labs
Let us start with the analysis of the non-cooperative scenario (denoted by
NC). The game is solved backward. The optimal level of effort is obtained
by maximizing the payoff functions (2) and (4) with respect to xpri and x
pu
i
respectively taking the distance between labs and the number of researchers
in each lab as given. This yields
∂Gpr
∂xpri
= 0 => xpri,nc = w
(d + 1)
2
(5)
∂Gpu
∂xpui
= 0 => xpui,nc =
w
a
(d + 1)
2
(6)
7
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We deduce collective research efforts in each lab:
Xprnc = (N − nnc)xprnc = (N − nnc)w
(d + 1)
2
(7)
Xpunc = nncx
pu
nc = nnc
w
a
(d + 1)
2
(8)
Individual efforts depend positively on distance between labs due to the
competition effect. Whatever the distance between labs, it is obvious that
at the non cooperative equilibrium the individual effort in the public lab is
lower than the individual effort in the private one:
xpunc < x
pr
nc
Replacing these individual effort values into Equation (2) gives the ex-
pression of the private lab payoff function in the second stage of the game:
Gprnc = (w)
2 (d + 1)
2
(
1
2
(N − n) + n
a
(1− d)
)
The private lab chooses the optimal distance, dnc, from the public lab by
maximizing its payoff function with respect to the distance d.
∂Gprnc
∂d
= 0⇔ N − n︸ ︷︷ ︸
effort effect
+ n(
1− dnc
a
− dnc + 1
a
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
spillover effect︸ ︷︷ ︸
net marginal benefit
= (N − n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
effort effect
− 1
2
(N − n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
competition effect︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal cost
(9)
⇐⇒ 1
2
(
N
n
− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
competition effect
=
1
a
(2dnc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
spillover effect
(10)
This maximization gives the following lemma:
Lemma 1. For a given n, the optimal distance dnc verifies the following
properties:
• dnc = a(N−n)4n where dnc is a solution of ∂G
pr
nc
∂d
= 0 if and only if n ≥ N a
4+a
with ∂dnc
∂n
= −aN
4n
• dnc = 1 otherwise
8
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• ∀n, the solution is unique : ∂2Gprnc
∂d2
= −2n
a
< 0
Proof : in Appendix 1. 
For a given number of researchers in each team, the distance between
both labs is the one that balances the marginal cost with the net marginal
benefit due to the marginal increase in distance as Equation (9) shows. The
right hand side of Expression (9) highlights the cost through two effects:
when the distance between both teams rises, it increases the cost due to the
research effort but it diminishes the cost due to the competition effect. In the
left hand side of Expression (9), two other opposite effects can be observed:
(i) indirectly, the distance increases the individual research efforts (effort
effect), (ii) the last effect characterizes the combination of spillover effects.
The increase of the distance between both teams diminishes the spillovers
towards the private team
(−n
a
(d + 1)
)
but increases also the effort of the
public researchers and so the spillovers from the public lab
(
n
a
(1− d)). The
total spillover effect is negative. At the optimum, the competition effect
which only depends on the number of researchers n is equal to the loss from
an increase of distance (spillover effect) (Equation 10).
The distance depends negatively on the number of researchers in the
public lab because when this number increases, it diminishes the effort effect
by more than twice the cost of competition effect whereas it increases the
spillover effect which is negative. The effect of n on the marginal private
payoff is clearly negative. In order to restablish the balance between the
marginal net benefit from effort and the marginal loss from spillover effect,
the private lab must choose to locate closer to the public team (diminution
of d), which reduces the negative spillover effect.
Following the standard coalition formation theory (d’Aspremont et al.,
1983; Carraro and Siniscalco, 2003), we define the equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1. The two-lab Nash equilibrium is defined by the following con-
ditions:
Gpu(n∗) > 0 and Gpr(n∗) > 0, (11)
Gpr(n∗) ≥ Gpu(n∗ − 1) and Gpu(n∗) ≥ Gpr(n∗ + 1) (12)
where 0 < n∗ < N .
9
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At this equilibrium, the private lab does not benefit from an additional
researcher and the public lab does not benefit that a researcher leaves its
team to join the private lab.
Assuming N sufficiently large, conditions (11) and (12) can be approximated
by the following non-cooperative equilibrium condition:
Gpunc(n
∗
nc) = G
pr
nc(n
∗
nc) (13)
In order to verify the stability property of the equilibrium, we have to
study both interior and corner solutions for dnc.
For the interior solution, we rewrite the payoff functions according to the
previous stages of the game:
Gpunc = nnc
[
s +
1
4
(w
a
)2
(1 + dnc)
]
(14)
Gprnc =
nnc
2
(w)2
a
(1 + dnc)
2 (15)
For the corner solution, the payoff functions rewrite
Gpunc(dnc = 1) = n(1)
[
s +
1
2
(w
a
)2]
(16)
Gprnc(dnc = 1) =
N − n(1)
2
(w)2 (17)
Determining the equilibrium of the game, we obtain the following propo-
sition
Proposition 1. Under NC scenario, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
is such that:
1. If the public subsidy s is ”too low” (s < s), only private research lab
exists, n∗ = 0.
2. If the public subvention s is equal to s, only public research lab exists,
n∗ = N .
3. If the public subsidy s is neither ”too high” (s ≤ s¯) nor ”too low”
(s > s), both research labs coexist with:
n∗nc = N
a
4d∗nc + a
with N
a
4 + a
≤ n∗nc < N
10
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and
d∗nc =
1
4a
[
1− 4a +
√
1 + 32sa
( a
w
)2]
∈ (0, 1]
4. If the public subsidy s is ”too high” (s > s¯), both research labs coexist
with:
n∗ (1) = N
1
2
(w)2
s + 1
2
(
w
a
)2
(1 + a2)
with 0 < n∗ (1) < N
a
4 + a
and
d∗nc = 1
With
s =
(w
a
)2 2a− 1
4
and s =
(w
a
)2 4a− 1
2
.
Proof : in Appendix 2. 
Corollary 1. Under NC scenario, the ”pure” RC (d∗nc = 0 with both labs)
may not emerge as an equilibrium of the game.
𝐺𝑝𝑟 
𝐺𝑝𝑢 
n*nc N 
𝐺𝑛𝑐  
𝑛𝑛𝑐 
Figure 1: Equilibrium number of re-
searchers in public lab
dnc
Gnc
n
𝐺𝑝𝑟
𝑛
 
𝐺𝑝𝑢
𝑛
 
1 𝑑∗nc 
Figure 2: Equilibrium distance in a
non cooperative case
From Proposition 1, depending on the level of public subsidy four types
of equilibrium outcomes of the two-stage game are possible:
11
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1. If the subsidy is too low (s < s), the public payoff is always lower than
the private payoff whatever the level of n ∈ [0, N ] so that N researchers
are employed by the private lab.
2. If the subsidy is such that s = s, there exists a unique value of n∗ = N
such that the public payoff is equal to the private one. In this case,
d∗nc = 0 but all researchers are employed in the public lab and the
private one disappears. We can deduce that the ’Research Cluster’
(d∗nc = 0) may not emerge as an equilibrium of the game (Corollary 1).
3. If s < s ≤ s, an equilibrium ensuring that both private and public
labs exist with 0 < d ≤ 1. Since n∗ defines the number of researchers
employed in the public lab, the remaining (N − n∗) researchers work
in the private lab. In the NC scenario, research in private lab is more
profitable than research in public lab when there are few researchers in
pu (see Figure 1). The low number of researchers working in pu may
incite the private lab, which benefits from spillovers, to move closer
to the public lab. As the number of researchers in pu increases, this
creates an incentive for pr to move closer (cf lemma 1). d∗nc is derived
from the optimal number of researchers in each lab so that both payoffs
are equal (see Figure 2)5.
4. If the subsidy is too high (s > s), the private lab chooses the maximum
distance between both labs and an equilibrium exists with both labs.
In this case, the spillover effect disappears but it is more efficient to
benefit from the diminution of the competition cost effect by increasing
the distance.
Figure 3 depicts the areas that characterize the different equilibria in the
non-cooperative case for the pairwise of parameters (s,a), i.e. the public
subsidy6 and the difference in valorisation capability between labs. A high
level of subsidy undoubtedly prevents the existence of a two lab equilibrium
with proximity because the private lab chooses to move away to avoid the
competition cost. A low level of subsidy (white area) is also harmful for a two
lab equilibrium since one of the lab is not viable. A two lab equilibrium is
more likely to be the outcome of the game for a low asymmetry in valorisation
capability. More precisely, a quite similar valorisation capability allows a
5When s = s¯, both payoffs are equal for d∗nc = 1. In this case, we obtain n
∗
nc = N
a
4+a
which corresponds to a different solution from equilibrium 4).
6We do not focus on the parameter w similar in each lab to concentrate our analysis
on both the level of public subsidy and the asymmetry in ’valorisation capability’. The
different areas of non-cooperative equilibria are depicted in Figure 3 for w = 20.
12
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.13
̅
Private lab
Two non cooperative labs
with proximity (0<d<1)
Two non cooperative
labs Hd = 1L
Public lab
1 2 3 4 5
a
s
Figure 3: Non cooperative equilibria
large range of public subsidy ensuring the co-existence of two close labs. For
an important asymmetry in the ’valorisation capability’, the range of public
subsidy ensuring the co-existence of two close labs is pretty small.
3.2 Cooperative research between public and private
labs labs
In the cooperative scenario, denoted by C, we consider a situation in which
labs coordinate their research efforts. Individual efforts are chosen so that
they maximize the joint payoff of the labs:
max
xi
(Gpu + Gpr)
∂Gc
∂xpri
= 0 => xpri,c = w
(d + 1)
2
(18)
∂Gc
∂xpui
= 0 => xpui,c =
w
a
(d + 1)
2
(1 + a(1− d)) (19)
We deduce the collective research effort in each lab:
Xprc = (N − nc)xprc = (N − nc)w
(d + 1)
2
(20)
13
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Xpuc = ncx
pu
c = nc
w
a
(d + 1)
2
(1 + a(1− d)) (21)
On the one hand, the expression of the individual effort in the private
lab is not modified (Equations (5) and (18)). On the other hand, compared
with Expression (6), it is obvious that the cooperative choice implies an
additional spillover effect (Equation 19). Now, the individual effort in the
public lab depends positively on the distance through the competition effect
while it depends negatively on the distance through the spillover effect. By
maximizing the payoff of the research labs jointly (public and private), the
externalities from the public to the private lab are internalized and spillovers
affect the individual effort in the public lab. The total effect depends on the
value of the distance: a high distance d implies a negative effect on the public
individual effort so that the spillover effect dominates the competition effect.
By replacing the optimal values of research efforts (18) and (19), we
rewrite the payoff functions (2) and (4) of both labs:
Gpuc = n
(
s +
1
4
(w
a
)2
(d + 1)
(
1− a2 (1− d)2)) (22)
Gprc = w
2(d + 1)
(
(N − n)
2
+
n
a
(1− d) (1 + a(1− d))
)
(23)
The private lab chooses non-cooperatively the optimal distance from the
public lab, dc, by maximising its payoff function with respect to the distance
d.
∂Gprc
∂d
= 0⇐⇒ 1
2
(
N
n
− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
competition effect
=
1
a
(2dc + a(1 + 3dc)(1− dc))︸ ︷︷ ︸
spillover effect
(24)
The analysis of the private payoff functions gives the following lemma:
Lemma 2. For a given n, the optimal distance dc verifies the following prop-
erties:
• dc = dint ∈
[
0; 1
2a
)
where dint is solution of
∂Gprc
∂d
= 0 if and only if n > n
with n = N 2a
2
2a2+(1+a)2
and ∂dint
∂n
< 0
• dc = 1 otherwise
Proof : in Appendix 3. 
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According to the expression of individual efforts in both labs and the
distance effect on theses individual efforts, we can immediately state that
when the distance impacts negatively the individual public effort and also the
spillover effect, the total effect through the public lab on the private payoff is
positive and the private payoff is increasing with the distance. Then, the only
solution is to choose the greatest distance. An interior solution may exist
when the positive effect of distance on the individual effort in the public lab
compensates the positive effect on the individual effort in the private lab.
This depends on the number of researchers in the public lab that must be
sufficient high to give a sufficient weight to the negative spillover effect in
order to compensate the positive individual effort effect.
According to Definitions (11) and (12), we have the following equilibrium
condition in C scenario:
Gpuc (n
∗
c) = G
pr
c (n
∗
c)
By Lemma 2, both cases dc = dint and dc = 1 must be studied since the
function Gpr depends on the level of n.
For the interior solution, the cooperative payoff functions, taken into
account the two previous stages of the game, rewrite:
Gpuc = nc
(
s +
1
4
(w
a
)2
(dc + 1)
(
1− a2 (1− dc)2
))
(25)
Gprc = nc
(
w2
(dc + 1)
2
2a
(1 + 2a(1− dc)
)
(26)
with dc solution of (24).
For the corner solution, the payoff functions in C are the same as in NC
(16) and (17) since the spillover effect disappears.
Proposition 2. Under C scenario, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is
such that:
1. If the public subsidy s is ”too low” (s < s˜), only the private researchlab exists, n∗ = 0.
2. If the public subsidy s is neither ”too high” (s < s˜) nor ”too low”
(s ≥ s˜), both research labs coexist with:
n∗c = N
a
2d∗c(2 + 2a− 3ad∗c) + 3a
with n¯ < n∗c < N
15
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.13
and
and d∗c ∈
[
0;
1
2a
)
3. If the public subsidy s is ”too high” (s ≥ s˜), both research labs coexist
with:
n∗ (1) = N
1
2
(w)2
s + 1
2
(
w
a
)2
(1 + a2)
with 0 < n∗ (1) ≤ n¯
With
s˜ =
(w
a
)2 (10a− 3) (1 + 2a)2
32a
and s˜ =
(w
a
)2 5a2 + 2a− 1
4
Proof : in Appendix 4. 
Corollary 2. Under C scenario, the ’pure’ RC (d∗c = 0 with both labs) may
emerge as an equilibrium of the game when s = s˜. In this case, the optimalnumber of researchers in the public lab is constant and equals to:
n∗c =
N
3
The ’pure’ RC equilibrium exhibits total research efforts:
Xprc (d
∗
c = 0) = w
N
3
and Xpuc (d
∗
c = 0) = w
N
3
(
1 + a
2a
)
and total payoff:
G∗c(d
∗
c = 0) = w
2N
3
(
1 + 2a
2a
)
Figure 4 depicts the equilibrium areas in the cooperative case. When
s = s˜, we verify that d∗c = 0; in contrast when s = s˜, the distance betweenlabs is maximal (d∗ = 1). For a level of subsidy lying between s˜ and s˜,we find that there is a continuum of cases where the private lab will choose
to locate at intermediate positions. Without cooperation (or coordination of
research efforts), the ’pure’ RC can not exist (Corollary 1). Under C scenario,
an equilibrium that consists only the public research lab may not emerge.
Cooperation is necessary to guarantee the existence of the equilibrium of
a ’pure’ research cluster which allows the minimal proximity between labs
16
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̅
̃
two cooperative labs 
with proximity (0<d<1)
two cooperative labs (d=1)
private lab
pure research cluster : two 
cooperative labs (d=0)
1 2 3 4 5
a
s
Figure 4: Cooperative equilibria
(d∗c = 0). The sustainability of ’pure’ research cluster depends on the subsidy
and organizational capability of each lab in terms of valorisation of research
efforts which correspond to s˜ (Corollary 2). The higher the asymmetry of’valorisation capability’, the higher the public subsidy s˜. In this case, thetotal effort of the private lab and the optimal size of labs are constant: only a
third of researchers will work in the public lab. The public lab efforts and the
total payoff are decreasing with the asymmetry in ’valorisation capability’.
4 Comparative results
In this section, we proceed to comparisons between the cooperative and the
non cooperative cases.
Let us start by comparing the impact of the public subsidy on the different
variables at the equilibrium.
Corollary 3. A rise in the public subsidy has the following effects:
17
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∂n∗
∂s
∂d∗
∂s
∂x∗
∂s
∂Xpr∗
∂s
∂Xpu∗
∂s
∂G∗
∂s
NC (int.sol.) < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
{
< 0 if a < 4
> 0 if a > 4
{
> 0 if s > sG
≤ 0 if s ≤ sG
C (int.sol.) < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
Corner (d = 1) < 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 < 0 > 0
where G∗ is the payoff of each lab (identical at the equibrium) and
sG =
(
w
a
)2 (4−a)(4a−a2−1)
8
Proof : in Appendix 5. 
Let us start by the effects that work similarly in both the non cooperative
(NC) and cooperative (C) cases, (i.e. the effect of the public subsidy on
the number of researchers in each lab, the distance, the individual research
efforts and the total effort in the private lab). The public subsidy has a
negative effect on the equilibrium level of researchers employed in the public
lab. By raising the public subsidy, the public lab’s payoff becomes higher
than the private lab’s payoff. The labour force ensures a balance between
the labs payoffs so that there are more researchers in the private lab at
the expense of the public one. For the new partition of labour, both payoffs
equate and both labs may coexist. As a consequence, the private lab remains
distant from the public one to reestablish the balance between the distance
cost competition effect and the distance spillover effect. Because there is
less competition among researchers, a public subsidy encourages an increase
in individual efforts (xi) in each lab. Whichever the case (NC or C) and
research organisation (public or private), the greater the distance between
the labs, the greater the individual efforts. The collective effort in the private
lab increases with the rise in the number of researchers and their individual
efforts. Now, let us comment on the effect of the public subsidy on the total
effort in the public sector. In the non cooperative case, when the asymmetry
in ’valorisation capability’ between the public and the private lab is low (i.e.
a < 4), the decline in the size of public lab has a negative impact on its
total effort that cannot be offset by any increase of individual efforts. When
the difference in ’valorisation capability’ is sufficiently high, then this decline
is more than offset by the individual effort reaction. In the cooperative
equilibrium, the result is clearcut: any increase in the public subvention
decreases the total effort in public sector; the decline in the size of public lab
always dominates the increase of individual efforts.
Finally, the payoffs decrease with the public subsidy at the cooperative
equilibrium while it can either decrease or increase at the non cooperative
18
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equilibrium depending on the level of subsidy. In the non cooperative case,
the positive effect on distance must be supported by a sufficient high public
subsidy to allow for a rise in the payoff. At the cooperative equilibrium,
the number of researchers effect (< 0) clearly dominates the distance effect
(> 0). In the extreme case of the corner solution, the maximum distance
(d = 1) allows the individual efforts of researchers to significantly intensify
(no competition effect): a rise in the public subsidy increases the equilibria
payoffs.
Let us now compare the equilibrium payoffs in the NC and C scenarii.
The equilibrium areas in the cooperative and non-cooperative cases are de-
picted in Figure (5). A high level of subsidy prevents the existence of an
equilibrium with proximity irrespective of whether the both labs cooperate
or not (Area 6). By contrast, a low level of subsidy (Area 1) only enables
the private lab to maintain the research activity. For intermediate levels of
subsidy, the cooperative and non-cooperative cases do not achieve the same
equilibrium results. Therefore, we have:
• Area 2: public lab alone (NC) vs private lab alone (C),
• Area 3: two close non-cooperative labs (NC) vs private lab alone (C),
• Area 4: two non-cooperative labs with d = 1 (NC) vs private lab alone
(C),
• Area 5: two close cooperative labs (C) vs two non-cooperative labs
with d = 1 (NC).
It is not clear, a priori, which equilibrium will imply a higher payoff in
each Area (2-5). By comparing the labs payoffs in each area, we obtain the
following proposition:
Proposition 3. There exist threshold levels of subsidy s such that:
• Area 2 (s = s): when a ≤ 2, the non cooperative equilibrium payoff
(public lab) dominates the cooperation equilibrium payoff (private lab)
(GpuA ≥ GprA ); for a > 2, the opposite result applies (GpuA < GprA ),
• Area 3 (s < s < s): if s < s1 < s < s the non cooperative equilibrium
payoff (two close labs, d < 1) dominates the cooperation equilibrium
payoff (private lab alone): G∗nc > G
pr
A ; if s < s < s1 < s the opposite
results applies.
19
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.13
• Area 4 (s ≤ s < s˜): the non cooperative equilibrium payoff (Corner,d = 1) always dominates the cooperation equilibrium payoff (private lab
alone): G∗nc(d = 1) > G
pr
A ,
7
• Area 5 ( s˜ ≤ s < s˜): if s˜ ≤ s < s2 < s˜, the cooperative equilibriumpayoff (two close labs, d < 1) dominates the non-cooperation equilib-
rium payoff (Corner, d = 1): G∗c > G
∗
nc(d = 1); if s˜ < s2 ≤ s < s˜ theopposite result applies.
where s1 =
(
w
a
)2 a2−2a−1+(2a−1)√a−3
8
and s2 is given by simulation
8.
Proof : See Appendix 5. 
According to Proposition 3, there are only two areas (Area 2 and Area 5)
in which the payoff of the cooperative equilibrium may dominate the payoff
of the non cooperative equilibrium. Note that in Area 5, for s2 < s < s˜
the non-cooperative equilibrium payoff dominates the cooperative one. This
quite surprising result is partly due to the nature of the equilibria that are
strongly determined by the couple of parameters (a, s). As Figure (5) depicts,
there is no couple (a, s) that allows for an equilibrium with two labs and
proximity under both the non-cooperative and the cooperative strategy as
the curve s˜ (in bold) is always above the curve s (in dash).
As depicted by Figure (6), whichever research behavior adopted (coop-
erative or not), a high asymmetry in the ’valorisation capability’ between
public and private lab does not favor spatial proximity. Compared to the
non-cooperative one, it is clear that the cooperative area is very reduced
especially when the parameter a is high. Finally, for all asymmetries in val-
orisation capability, the level of public subsidy allowing for the existence of
clusters is always higher than in the non cooperative case, s¯ ≤ s˜. For thesame valorisation capability (a = 1), we verify that s¯ = s˜. In this case, the’pure’ cluster with d∗c = 0 emerges as an equilibrium of the game.
In the following Corollary (4) we concentrate our analysis on the ’pure’
research cluster performances:
7This result stands for any a < 12. We have decided to rule out the unlikely cases
where a > 2
8Since we do not have any analytical values of the optimal distance and number of
researchers in each lab in the cooperative case, we are not able to produce analytical
results for the comparison of the payoff. We proceed to simulations to compare them.
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Figure 5: Cooperative and non-
cooperative equilibria.
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Figure 6: Payoff equilibria domi-
nance.
Corollary 4. For s = s˜, the cooperative payoff resulting from the ’pure’ RCequilibrium (d∗c = 0 with both labs) dominates the non-cooperative equilibrium
payoff (corner solution, i.e. d = 1) and we verify:
• n∗c(dc = 0) > n(1)
• xpuc ∗(dc = 0) > xpu(d = 1) and xprc ∗(dc = 0) = xpr(d = 1)
• a) Xpuc ∗(dc = 0) > Xpu(d = 1)
b) Xprc
∗(dc = 0) < Xpr(d = 1)
c) Xc
∗(dc = 0) < X(d = 1)
A ’pure’ research cluster equilibrium implies a bigger public lab than a
non cooperative equilibrium with d = 1. In addition, we find that a ’pure’ RC
does not affect the individual research effort in the private lab but encourages
the researchers’ efforts in the public lab. Consequently, the total research
effort in public lab at the ’pure’ RC equilibrium is greater than the total
public effort at the non-cooperative equilibrium. However, compared to non-
cooperative equilibrium, the improvement on research efforts in public lab is
not enough to counterbalance the decrease of the total research effort in the
private lab (since the number of researchers in the private lab is lower than a
non cooperative equilibrium). Although the total output gains are better in
the ’pure’ RC, this performance may be moderated by the results in terms
of research efforts. The research cluster facilitates spatial proximity and can
yield a higher output gain that can be appropriated by each lab than in non-
cooperation. But, we find that a ’pure’ RC cannot perform better in terms
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of total research efforts, even if it allows to encourage the public research
effort.
5 Conclusion
Only a few years ago, the conventional wisdom predicted that research clus-
ters would lead to foster public-private research linkages that may help firms
to internalize the knowledge spillovers from the academic research sector,
resulting in greater research efforts. The obsession of policy-makers in devel-
oped countries to ’create the next Silicon Valley’ reveals the increased impor-
tance of spatial proximity in innovative activity. However, public authorities
cannot force firms and other research actors to cooperate and to choose the
closest location. The implementation of cluster policies is complex and it
is actually difficult to know how to target such cluster policies (Duranton,
2007; Falck et al., 2010; Fontagne´ et al., 2013; Duranton et al., 2010). Thus,
the first interesting question that arises is under which conditions the private
research sector opts for the spatial proximity to universities. If the ability to
receive knowledge spillovers is influenced by the distance from the knowledge
source (as pointed out by several empirical studies), the spatial concentration
should always be observed. However, the propensity for innovative activity
to cluster geographically varies across industries, countries, regions, etc. An-
other question concerns the performance of the research cluster: does the
cooperation with proximity (RC) lead to better performance than the non-
cooperation with distant location?
In this paper, we developed a two-stage game for a better understanding
of the endogenous formation of a research cluster. The model highlights
the role of public subsidies and valorization capabilities in the emergence of
research clusters. By determining the equilibria of the non cooperative and
cooperative cases, we are able to depict the range of public subsidies allowing
for the co-existence of two close labs for a given valorization capability. We
show that a low level of the public subsidy is harmful for the existence of the
public research while a high level of the public subsidy implies the highest
distance between labs; the higher the asymmetries in valorisation capabilities
between the public and the private labs, the more difficult it is to ensure the
research cluster formation.
We may retain two major lessons from our results in order to provide
guidelines for research policies: (i) increase the level of public subsidy is
not necessarily efficient to sustain RC. This reduces the positive spillovers
from the public research sector to the private research sector and leads the
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private research lab to locate further away from public research lab; (ii) if
the objectives of a policy-maker is to ensure greater production and better
dissemination of new knowledge, cluster policies are not the panacea: a RC
provides a stimulus to research efforts in the public lab at the expense of the
private lab. At the aggregate level, the performance is lower than the non
cooperative one in terms of research efforts.
In addition, we should note that these results have been obtained in the
context of interaction between only two labs without taking into account the
market of knowledge (valorization capability in research is given by exogenous
parameters). Our analysis can be seen as a first step in the understanding
of the formation of research clusters. We still need new insights from theory
to better assess the existence conditions and the performance of research
clusters.
Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1
Equation 9 is equivalent to dnc =
a(N−n)
4n
which is verified if and only if
0 ≤ a (N − n)
4n
≤ 1
The left hand side is always checked if and only if n ≤ N , while the right
hand side holds if and only if n ≥ N a
4+a
.
If n < N a
4+a
, the optimal solution is to choose d = 1 which corresponds to
the corner solution.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1
According to (13), an equilibrium with both labs and an interior solution for
d exists if and only if
Dnc = G
pu
nc −Gprnc = 0⇐⇒ n
(
s +
1
4
(w
a
)2
(2 + dnc)
)
=
n
2a
(w)2 (1 + dnc)
2
We define
F (dnc) = s +
1
2
(
wpr
a
)2
(1 + dnc)
(
1
2
− a (1 + dnc)
)
and d∗nc is solution of F (d
∗
nc) = 0. Let us study function F :
F ′ (dnc) =
1
2
(
wpr
a
)2(
1
2
− 2a (1 + dnc)
)
< 0 ∀a > 1
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F” (dnc) = −a
(w
a
)2
< 0
F (0) = s +
1
2
(
wpr
a
)2(
1
2
− a
)
> 0⇔ s >
(
wpr
a
)2(
2a− 1
4
)
= s (27)
F (1) = s +
(
wpr
a
)2(
1
2
− 2a
)
< 0⇐⇒ s <
(
wpr
a
)2(
4a− 1
2
)
= s (28)
F is always decreasing. There exists a d∗nc ∈ (0, 1] such that F (d∗nc) = 0
if and only if F (1) ≤ 0 that holds when s ≤ s and F (0) > 0 when s > s. We
can deduce:
• When s < s, Equation (13) is satisfied for a nnc > N which induces
that Gprnc is always superior to G
pu
nc for any 0 ≤ n ≤ N . Consequently,
only the private lab remains and n∗nc = 0.
• When s = s, from Equations (9) and (13) we have n∗nc = N . Thus only
the public lab exists.
• When s < s ≤ s¯, the analysis of Function F shows that there exists a
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, 0 < n∗nc < N , which implies
that d∗nc ∈ (0, 1]:
n∗nc is obtained by equation :
n∗nc = N
a
4d∗nc(n∗c) + a
with N
a
4 + a
≤ n∗nc < N for d∗nc ∈ (0, 1]
• When s > s, nnc resulting from (13) is such as dnc ≥ 1. As nnc < N a4+a ,
the optimal solution is to choose d∗ = 1 which corresponds to the corner
solution. Thus,
n∗ (1) = N
1
2
(w)2
s + 1
2
(
w
a
)2
(1 + a2)
with 0 < n∗ (1) < N
a
4 + a
(29)
Appendix 3: Proof of Lemma 2
Let us study the form of the private payoff function according to dc
∂2 (Gprc )
∂d2
= −2n
a
(1 + a− 3ad)
which implies that the private payoff is concave on d ∈ (0, 1+a
3a
]
and convex
on d ∈ [1+a
3a
, 1
]
.
24
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.13
Let us show that 0 < dint <
1+a
3a
.
If an interior solution exists, the level of d is given by the relation
∂Gprc
∂d
= 0
⇐⇒ 1
2
(N − n) = n
a
(2dint (1 + a(1− dint)) + a (1 + dint) (1− dint)) (30)
Thus, we deduce the relation between n and d for a given n:
n = N
a
2dint(2 + 2a− 3adint) + 3a (31)
with n ∈ (0, N) for any d ∈ [0, 1] 9.
Now let us compare Gprc (1) and G
pr
c (dint).
Gprc (dint)−Gprc (1) = (wpr)2 (1− dint)2
n
a
(1− 2adint) > 0⇐⇒ dint < 1
2a
Let check that dint <
1
2a
.
∂Gprc
∂d
∣∣∣∣
dint=
1
2a
=
1
2
(
N − n
(
(2a + 1)
2a2
2
+ 1
))
We can state that dint <
1
2a
if ∂G
pr
c
∂d
∣∣∣
dint=
1
2a
< 0, since we are located on
the concave part of the curve described by ∂G
pr
c
∂d
∂Gprc
∂d
∣∣∣∣
dint=
1
2a
< 0⇔ n > N 2a
2
2a2 + (1 + 2a)2
= n (32)
From (31), we obtain
∂dc
∂nc
= −
(
(1 + 2a− 3ad)aN
[dc(4 + 8a− 6adc)− (a + 2)]2
)−1
< 0⇐⇒ d < 1 + 2a
3a
which is verified for an interior solution.
Consequently, dint ∈
[
0; 1
2a
)
where dint is solution of
∂Gprc
∂d
= 0 if and only
if n > n. When condition (32) is not satisfied, the corner solution holds:
dc = 1 since
Gprc (dint) ≤ Gprc (1)
9We have n < N ⇐⇒ 1+a−
√
1+2a+4a2
3a < 0 < dint ≤ 1 < 1+a+
√
1+2a+4a2
3a
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Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 2
According to (25) and (35) we can state that and interior solution exists if
Gpuc
n
− G
pr
c
n
= 0
We have to analyze the following function:
H (d) =
Gpuc
n
− G
pr
c
n
=
(
s +
1
4
(w
a
)2
(d + 1)
(
1− a2 (1− d)2))− (w2((d + 1)2
2a
)
(1 + 2a (1− d))
)
We obtain:
H ′ (d) =
(
wpr
a
)2
1
4
(
1− 4a (1 + d) + a2 (9d2 + 10d− 3))
H ′ (0) =
(
wpr
a
)2
1
4
(
1− 4a− 3a2) < 0
H ′
(
1
2a
)
=
(
wpr
a
)2
1
4
(
1− 4a
(
1 +
1
2a
)
+ a2
(
9
4a2
+
5
a
− 3
))
=
(
wpr
a
)2
1
16
(
5 + 4a− 12a2) < 0
H ′′ (d) =
(w
a
)2 1
4
(
18a2d + 10a2 − 4a) > 0
Then H(dint) is decreasing for any d ∈
[
0; 1
2a
)
.
We now determine the value of H(dint) for the boundary values of d:
• If H ( 1
2a
) ≥ 0, we have H (d) ≥ 0 for any dint ∈ [0, 1) and we have
Gpuc ≥ Gprc , for 0 < n < N . In this case, any interior solution exists.
Then, the corner solution dc = 1 holds when:
H
(
1
2a
)
≥ 0
⇐⇒ s > s˜ = (10a− 3) (1 + 2a)
2
32a
(w
a
)2
(33)
The optimal level of n is given by Gpuc (dc = 1) = G
pr
c (dc = 1) which implies
n∗(1).
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• If H (0) < 0, we have H (d) < 0 and Gprc > Gpuc for 0 < n < N . Then n∗ = 0
and only the private lab exists. We have
H (0) = s− 5a
2 + 2a− 1
4
(w
a
)2
< 0
⇐⇒ s < 5a
2 + 2a− 1
4
(w
a
)2
= s˜ (34)
• If H (0) = 0, we have
Gprc (d = 0) = G
pu
c (d = 0)
⇐⇒ s = s˜
We obtain an interior solution with n∗ = N3 .
• From the three previous points, we can state that if s˜ ≤ s < s˜, there exists
a cooperative interior solution value with n¯ < n∗c < N and d∗c ∈
[
0; 12a
)
Appendix 5: Proof of Corollary 3
i) The non-cooperative scenario:
According to (13), an equilibrium in NC with both research labs and an
interior solution for d exists if and only if
s +
1
4
(w
a
)2
(1 + d∗nc) =
w2
2a
(1 + d∗nc)
2
The total derivative of the above expression with respect to s gives:
1 +
1
4
(w
a
)2 ∂d∗nc
∂s
=
(
w2
a
)
(1 + d∗nc)
∂d∗nc
∂s
∂d∗nc
∂s
=
( a
w
)2( 4
4a (1 + d∗nc)− 1
)
> 0
from n∗nc = N
a
4d∗nc+a
, we have
∂n∗nc
∂s
= −n∗nc
4
4d∗nc + a
∂d∗nc
∂s
< 0
Obviously, from Equations (5), (6) and (7), we have
∂xpr∗nc
∂s
> 0,
∂xpu∗nc
∂s
> 0 and
∂Xpr∗nc
∂s
> 0
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∂Xpu∗nc
∂s
=
1
2
w
a
(
∂n∗nc
∂s
(1 + d∗nc) + n
∗
nc
∂d∗nc
∂s
)
=
1
2
w
a
(
−n∗nc
4
4d∗nc + a
∂d∗nc
∂s
(1 + d∗nc) + n
∗
nc
∂d∗nc
∂s
)
=
1
2
w
a
n∗nc
∂d∗nc
∂s
(
a− 4
4d∗nc + a
)
> 0⇐⇒ a > 4
and we deduce the effect on G∗nc =
1
2
w2
a
n∗nc (1 + d
∗
nc)
2
∂G∗nc
∂s
=
1
2
w2
a
(
∂n∗nc
∂s
(1 + d∗nc)
2 + 2n∗nc
∂d∗nc
∂s
(1 + d∗nc)
)
=
1
2
w2
a
∂d∗nc
∂s
(1 + d∗nc)n
∗
nc
(4d∗nc + a)
2 (2d∗nc + a− 2) > 0⇐⇒ d∗nc >
2− a
2
Replacing d∗nc by its expression given in Proposition 1, we obtain:
∂G∗nc
∂s
> 0⇐⇒ s > sG =
(w
a
)2 (4− a) (4a− a2 − 1)
8
ii) The cooperative scenario:
From Proposition 2,
Gpuc (d
∗
c) = G
pr
c (d
∗
c)
⇔ s+1
4
(w
a
)2
(d∗c + 1)
(
1− a2 (1− d∗c)2
)
=
1
2
(
w2
a
)
(d∗c + 1)
2 (1 + 2a (1− d∗c))
The total derivative of the above expression with respect to s gives:
ds = dd∗c
(
−
∂(G
pu
c
n∗c
− Gprc
n∗c
)
∂d∗c
)
We obtain from the analysis of function H in the Appendix 4 that
∂d∗c
∂s
= − 1
∂H
∂d∗c
> 0
from (31), we calculate:
∂n∗nc
∂s
= −n∗nc
∂d∗c
∂s
4 (1 + a− 3ad∗c)
2d∗c(2 + 2a− 3ad∗c) + 3a
< 0 since d∗c ∈
[
0,
1
2a
)
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Obviously, from Equations (18), (19) and (20), we have
∂xpr∗c
∂s
> 0,
∂xpu∗c
∂s
> 0 and
∂Xpr∗c
∂s
> 0
∂Xpu∗c
∂s
=
1
2
w
a
(
∂n∗c
∂s
(d∗c + 1) (1 + a(1− d∗c)) + n∗nc
∂d∗c
∂s
(1− 2ad∗c)
)
=
1
2
w
a
n∗nc
∂d∗c
∂s
(−4 + 7ad∗c − 5a (1− d∗c)− 2ad∗c2 (a− 1)− 2a2 (1− d∗c) (2− d∗c)
2d∗c(2 + 2a− 3ad∗c) + 3a
)
< 0
since d∗c <
1
2a
and we deduce the effect on G∗c = n
∗
c
(
w2
a
)
(d∗c + 1)
2 (1 + 2a (1− d∗c))
∂G∗c
∂s
=
w2
a
(d∗c + 1)
(
∂n∗c
∂s
(d∗c + 1) (1 + 2a (1− d∗c)) + n∗c
∂d∗c
∂s
(2 (1 + a− 3ad∗c))
)
=
2w2
a
(d∗c + 1)n
∗
nc
∂d∗c
∂s
(1 + a− 3ad∗c)
(−a− 2 (1− d∗c)− 4ad∗c − 2ad∗c2)
2dint(2 + 2a− 3ad∗c) + 3a
< 0
(iii) The Corner solution:
From Equation (29), we easily obtain that
∂n∗ (1)
∂s
< 0
Obviously, from Equations (7) and (8), we deduce
∂Xpr∗(d = 1)
∂s
> 0,
∂Xpu∗(d = 1)
∂s
< 0
From Equation (17), we have
∂G∗ (d = 1)
∂s
> 0
Appendix 6: Proof of Proposition 3
Let us compare the payoff in the different Areas. We denote by G∗c and G
∗
nc
the equilibrium payoff resulting from the cooperative and non-cooperative
strategies.
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• Area 2 with s = s (given by equation (27)).
From equations (1), (3), (6), and (18), we compare:
G∗nc = G
pu
A = N
1
2
(w
a
)2(2a + 1
2
)
with
G∗c = G
pr
A = N
w
4
2
We obtain
G∗c > G
∗
nc ⇐⇒ 1 >
(
2a + 1
2a2
)
⇐⇒ a > 2
• Area 3 with s ≤ s < s (given by equations (27) and (28)).
From equations (1), (14), (15) and (18), we compare:
G∗nc = G
pu∗
nc + G
pr∗
nc = n
w2
a
(1 + d)2
with
G∗c = G
pr
A = N
w
4
2
We obtain
G∗nc > G∗c ⇐⇒
n
a
w2 (1 + d)2 > Nw
4
2
⇐⇒ n
a
(1 + d)2 > N
4
⇐⇒ 2 (1 + d∗nc)2 > 4d∗nc + a
⇐⇒ 4d (d + 1) > a− 4
wich is always true for a 6 4.
If a > 4 we have G∗nc > G∗c ⇐⇒ d∗nc > −1+
√
a−3
2
replacing the value of d∗nc, we obtain
1
4a
[
1− 4a +
√
1 + 32sa
( a
wpr
)2]
>
−1 +√a− 2
2
⇐⇒
√
1 + 32sa
( a
wpr
)2
> 2a
√
a− 3 + 2a− 1
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⇐⇒ 1 + 32sa
( a
wpr
)2
>
(
2a
√
a− 3 + 2a− 1)2
⇐⇒ s > 4a
2 (a− 2) + 4a (2a− 1)√a− 3− 4a
32a
(
a
wpr
)2
⇐⇒ s >
(w
a
)2 a2 − 2a− 1 + (2a− 1)√a− 3
8
= s1
• Area 4 with s < s < s˜ (given by equations (28) and (34)).From equations (1), (6), (16), (17), (18) and (29), we compare:
G∗c = G
pr
A = N
w
4
2
with
G∗nc = G
pu
nc (1) + G
pr
nc (1) = w
2 (N − n (1))
We obtain
G∗nc > G
∗
c ⇐⇒
N
4
< (N − n (1))
⇐⇒ 1
4
<
(
1−
1
2
w2
s + 1
2
w2
a2
(1 + a2)
)
⇐⇒
1
2
w2
s + 1
2
w2
a2
(1 + a2)
<
3
4
⇐⇒ w
2
a2
(
a2 − 3
6
)
< s
We verify that s > w
2
a2
(
a2−3
6
)
⇐⇒ a > 12. We consider that any
analysis with a > 12 can be ruled out.
• Area 5 with s˜ < s < s˜ (given by equations (34)and (33)).From equations (17),(25), (29) and (31), we compare
G∗nc = 2n (1)
[
s +
1
2
(
wpr
a
)2]
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with
G∗c = G
pu
c
∗ + Gprc
∗
where
Gpu∗c = n
∗
c
(
s +
1
4
(
wpr
a
)2
(d∗ + 1)
(
1− a2 (1− d∗)2))
and
Gpr∗c = nc
(
w2
(dc + 1)
2
2a
(1 + 2a(1− dc)
)
Since we do not have any analytical values of the optimal distance and
number of researchers in each lab in the cooperative case, we are unable
to produce analytical results for the comparison of the payoff. We
proceed to simulations to compare them. Simulations are undertaken
for w = 20. For any s > s2, we have G
∗
nc > G
∗
c . The following table
gives the value of s2.
a 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
s˜ 600 588.889 575 564 555.556 548.98 543.75 539.506 536
s2 760.293 682.05 634.554 603.741 582.325 573.032 554.652 545.219 537.602
s˜ 787.5 711.111 664.063 633.6 612.5 597.085 585.352 576.132 568.7
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